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1.  INTRODUCTION
The informal  sector is tie. set of economic  units which do not comply  with one or more
government-imposed  taxes and regulations  but whose product is considered  as legal.'
The presence of large informal  sectors in all economic  activities  is one of the most
important  characterisdcs  of developing  countries: Informal  sectors employ between 35 and 65
percent of the labor force and produce 20 to 40 percent of GDP. 2
The informal  sector arises when an excessive  regulatory  system is coupled with an
inefficient  and corrupt system of compliance  control.  An excessive  regulatory system  makes the
formal economy  costly and unatactive  by imposing  high entry costs to legality, through license
fees and registration  requirements,  and high costs to remaining  legal, through  taxes, red tape, and
labor, environmental,  and various other regulations.?
However, escaping  taxes and regulations  is not costless: An informal  status entails many
disadvantages. When an informal  activity is detected, stiff penalties, in the form of pecuniary
fines or capital confiscation,  are applied.  Furthermore,  because  of their illegal  status, they do
not enjoy full and enforceable  property rights over their capital and product  This has a number
of deleterious  consequences: First, informal  producers  are poorly protected  by the police and the
judicial courts from crimes committed  against  their property. Second, since they lack the
capacity to enter into legally  bindiag contaal  obligations,  their access to capital markets, for
'For an overview  of the definition  and characteristics  of informal  economies,  see  Chapter 1.
2Chickering  and Salahdine  (1991), p. 3.
3De Sowo  (1989).
-2-financial,  insurance, and corporative purposes,  is seriously limited.  And third, they find
obstacles to use some other public services, such as social welfare,  skill training programs,  and
government-sponsored credit facilities.
The bureaucracy, as the institution controlling and monitoring the regulatory system,
plays a crucial role in the formation of informal economies.  If the bureaucracy profits in some
way from the presence of the informal sector, it will create an environment that makes
informality attractive or simply unavoidable.
In this paper we model the presence of informal sectors in the economy and their
relationship to economic growth.  To accomplish this goal, we use the framework of the
endogenous growth literature.'  Specifically, we use the work in which govermnent's
participation in production, through the provision of public goods and services, is considered
explicitly,  as in Barro (1990), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
In the sense ihat the informal sector is modeled as not paying taxes, this paper can be
considered as a general equilibrium model of tax evasion.5 However, we depart from the tax
evasion literature by considering informality as an alternative to legality, entailing different
production relations to government institutions and services, other firms,  and capital markets.
We also depart from the prevailing modelling approach to informal economies, approach
which focuses on labor market segmentation and rural-urban migration.6
4See Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), and Rebelo (1991).
5One of the earliest and  most influential  tieoretical  papers  on tax evasion is Allingham and
Sandmo (1972).  Cowell (1990) and Tanzi  and  Shome (1993) survey  the recent  theoretical  and
empirical  literature  on the subject.  Alm,  McClelland,  and Schulze (1992) present  experimental
evidence on the individual reasons for tax compliance.
6See Chaudhury (1989), Rauch (1991), Gupta (1993),  and Chapter 3.
-3-In a general sense, we follow the methodology  outlined  by Becker (1968)  to the study of
illegal  behavior:  Economic  agents in our model  are interested  in optimizing  the expected  value
of intertemporal  utility and choose, accordingly,  whether or not to belong to the informal  sector.
In Section  II we set up the model. We consider a production technology  in which
publicly-provided  goods and services are essential  to private production and are financed  by tax
revenues  from the formal sector.  Examples  of these publicly-provided  goods are transportation
facilities,  public utilities, education  and health programs,  judicial courts, public credit agencies,
and domestic  security (police, prisons). These public services  are rival (subject  to congestion)
and to some extent excludable: Informal  producers can only use some of them.  In Section III
we study the steady state of the economy,  a state when both formal and informal  sectors grow at
the same constant  rate.  We find that the relative size (in terms of capital or output)  of the
informal  sector is negatively  related to the severity of the penalties and positively  related to tax
rates, the extent of informal  use of public services, and the exogenous  productivity  of the
economy. Furtiermore, we find that the return on capital and, thus, the economic  growth rate is
negatively  affected by the relative size of the informal  sector;  this is so because of the inherent
disadvantages  of informal activities  and because  the informal  sector does not contribute  to
financing  productive  public services. Finally, we find that the presence of entry costs into the
formal  economy  produces a steady state with a larger relative size of the informal sector and a
lower rate of economic  growth, when compared  to the case with no access costs to fornality.
In Section  IV we analyze  government's  behavior. We first assume that government  is
optimizing  a given social welfare function,  and we find that the social optimum involves  the
disappearance  of the informal sector. We then analyze the case when government  is partially
controlled  by a sel-interested bureaucracy,  which profits from the presence  of the informal sector
-4-through the appropriation  of penalty revenues. We argue that short-sighted  and socially-
unaccountable  bureaucracies  are the most harmful to economic  growth and social welfare.
In Section V we introduce  uncertainty  in production  to study how the inability to use
insurance  and capital  markets, which allow risk diversification,  makes informality  less attractive.
Section  VI concludes.
1L. PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND UTILITY OPTIMIZATION
The economy  is populated by a continuum  of agents in the interval [0,11. Each of them
is endowed  with a (possibly  different) starting level of a broad measure of capital, which is meant
to include  physical as well as human capital. They can operate a basic technology  to produce a
single good in the form of consumables  or capital.  Raw labor is not an input of production.
Agents maximize$i  expected  value of discounted  utility (U):
U  Eofu(c(t))e  -Pdt  ()
There are two different sectors in the economy  to vWhich  agents choose to belong: the
formal and the informal  sectors.  We refer to the people belonging  to each sector as the
"formals" and "informals,"  respectively. Formals  pay taxes in the form of a proportional income
tax, the proceeds of which are used to finance  the provision of public services.  The net-of-tax
flow of output to formal producers is given by 7
7The superscripts  F and I correspond  to the formal and informal sectors, respectively. Agents
are indexed  by the subscript i-  Aggregate  quantities  omit this subscript.
-5-yl  = aFki  (2)
where aF  is the net-of-tax  expected  return on capital, i.e. flow of production  per unit of capital.
For informal  producers, the flow of output is given by
Y  = a'Ikc  (3)
where a' denotes the return on capital in the informal  sector. lnformals do not pay taxes.
However, they must pay a penalty when caught. Penalties  consist of a fracdon of the capital
belonging  to informal  agents. We assume that the proceeds from penalties are appropriated  by
government  officials  (the bureaucracy)  for their own  good (we expand  on this issue in section V);
therefore, penalty revenues are not used to finance public  services.
We follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1992)  in assuming  that the net-of-tax  retrn  on capital
depends  on the available  amount of public services  relative to aggregate  production:
y  )/ ccs =  )
where A is an exogenous  productivity  parameter, g is the flow of public services, r is the tax
rate, f  is the fraction  of public services  used by informal  producers, and y'  =  (1-7)4  +  ey is
aggregate  production  which congests  public services 8. Informals  have access to the same basic
technology,  but they use only the fraction  e, O<e<  1, of available  public services.  That is,
informal  producers can use only some public services  without  being caught with probability 1;
sNote that since the informal sector only uses the fraction e of public services, we assume that
y'  only includes  the fraction E of total informal  output.
-6-then, trying to avoid being caught, they choose not to use some public services.  Examples  of
public services not enjoyed by informal  producers are the police, courts of law, and government-
sponsored  credit and training  programs.
Letfl be the ratio of informal  to formal output.  That is,
Ir
(1-i)'y




F  -A(1--r)(  T  )
(4)
The effect of a bigger informal  sector, higher  f,  is clear from (4).  Infonnal producers
congest  public services but do not contribute  to financing  them;  therefore, an increase  in the
relative size of the informal  sector lowers productivity  for every one in the economy.  It is also
clear from (4) that, for a given tax rate, formal producers would like the informal sector to
shrink to extinction.
Optimization
We concentrate on the study of the steady state of the economy, which is defined as the
state where the ratio of informal  to formal production is constant and the aggregate  economy
grows at a constant rate.
-7-Define  the current value function Vftk,',t) as the optimal  value of expected  discounted
utility, measured  as of time t.  The value function  depends on the individual  capital  stock at time
z, that is, k(t).  In general, the value function  also depends  on the future evolution  of the
economy  (which, of course, is not under the control  of the individual); this dependence  is
allowed  for by the independent  argument  t in the value funcdon.  However, in the steady state,
the form of the value function does not change  with time (other than through  changes  in the
individual's  capital stock) because the problem  faced by the individual  is the same at any point in
time. Since  we study the economy  in the steady state, our value functions  will not be time
dependent. Then, we simply write the value function  as Vf(k).
The Formal Sector
The formal agent's problem is to maximize  U subject to
dk, = £Fkd  - co  (5)
Assume  that instantaneous  utility is logaridumic.  For fcrmal agents, V(kjl satisfies  the
following  Bellman  equation
pVF(ki) = MAX I log(c)  + Vf(k1)(ak-c,)  1  (6)
c1
where V4F  is the partial derivative  of VI  with respect to capital. The F.O.C. for maxinization is
-=  Yk (ts3
Ci
That is, the consumer  equates the marginal  utility  of current consumption  to the marginal utility
of capital. Therefore, V' satisfies  the following  differential  equation:
p1V(k)  = -log(Vk(k))  i  dc' 4(kC)k  - 1
-a-with boundary  condition
ulm VF(k)e-P  = O
f-r
The soludon for V  is given by
VJ  (k=  -log(pk)  +  BP  (7)
where,
BF  =  1  (aF-
p
From the F.O.C., it is clear that consumption  is given by c,  pk,, a fixed fraction  of
wealth.  Therefore, the individual's capital stock evolves  according to
dk,  =  (NP  p)kidt  (8)
Let the distribution  of capital in the economy  at time t be given by the density  function
f,(k).  That is, fAc(kddk  is the "amount" of people with k, = ko  at time t.  Also, let I,  be the
fraction of people that belongs  to the formal secmor  at time t;  then
Pe = f,r(kdII
where the integral is taken over the set F of formal agents. Total capitl! in the formal sector (kF)
at time t is given by
kF  =  f  ,(k)&  = p,E(kJiebF)
When no capital flows to or from the formal sector, aggregation  over formal individual
-9-budget constraints  dictates die evolution  of aggregate  capital in the formal sector4.
dk,  F
Therefore, when no capital flows to or from the formal sector, its growth rate of capital (-yF)  is
given by
r  a  (9)
The Informal  Sector
Informals  do not pay taxes, but they face a positive probability  of being caught and, thus,
having  to pay a penalty, at any point in time.  The penalty consists of the fraction  b of capital  or
its equivalent in goods. Formally, the occurrence of this event is assumed  to follow a Poisson
process. The Poisson  process is continuous  in time but allows discreet or discontinuous  changes
in the state space.  Let q,(t) be an independent  Poisson  process with the following  probability
structure:
Prob {event  does not occur in the time interval dt)  =  I - Xd
Prob {event  occurs once in the interval  dr} = Xdt
Prob {event  occurs more than once in the interval  dt} = 0
We also assume that q, and qj are independent  for different  individuals  i and  j.
The budget constraint for informal  agent i is
9In fact, as is explained  below, in the steady state with no entry costs, capital flows from the
informal to the formal sector.  Therefore, the growth rate of capital in the formal sector will be
different from that in equation  (9).
-10-dk, =  Wkfdt - c*  - bk 4 dq 1 (16)
Equadon (10) is the short-hand expression for the stochastic integral of k4(t). Note that, as
opposed to the usual continuous diffusion process, q 1 is continuous in time but not in the state
space.  Thus,  if the Poisson event occurs,  there is a discontinuous jump in k; by the amount -bk,.
This jump is different  in nature to a flow change, which is the case with the first two components
of the change in k.
Note that if informals could buy a penalty insurance, the stochastic nature of the penalties
would be irrelevant.  This possibility is precluded by the assumption that infonnals cannot use
insurance markets;  in this way, the effect of stochastic penalties on expected utility is preserved.
Informals maximize U subject to (10).  Let VNk  be the optimal value of total expected
utility U, measured as of time  ,  and starting in state k,.  The Bellman equation for  V  is
p  V(k)  = MAX {log(c) + Vk)  (dIk-c)  +  [V'(k,tl -b)) - V'Q4)])  (11)
CI
Equation (11) states that the maximized flow retr  log(c) plus the expected change in V  has to
be equal to p V.  The first part of the expected change in total utility corresponds to the
continuous variation in capital given by production and consumption.  The last part is the
discontinuous change in utility caused by penalties.  The F.O.C.  for maximization is given by
1  =  Vk(k,)
C-
Substituting the F.O.C.  into the Bellman equatiun,  we get the following differential
equation for  9:
pV'(kc  =  -log(Vf(kc))  +  4[V'(kAI-b))-V'(k)f  - 1
-11-with boundary condition
lim  V(k(t))e-P'  = O
7he soludon for r"  is given by
Vl(k)  =log(pk)  +  B'  (12)
p
where,
B'  - 1  [cc'-  p  +klog(  -b)]
p
NoMe  that th  tern  log(1-b)  corresponds to the loss in utility caused by the expectation of capital
expropriation.  From the F.O.C.,  consuinption is given by c, =  pok.  Given optimal consumption,
the informal individual capital stock evolves according to
('  p)  dt-  bkidq 1 (13)
Let the measure of infornal  people at time t be  (1-I&.  Then aggregate informal capital is
kl=  r(1-L)E(k 1Iie4
When no capital flows to or from the informal secor,  the evolution of informal aggregate
capital is dictated by the dhange in average capita  in the sector.  That is, to get the equation of
motion for aggregate informal capital (w5, we take expected values (over  individuals) in (13).
Since the q processes are uncorreied  E(k4/  ide)  =E(ki/  iel) A.  Then,
dk'  =  (a'-p-Ab)k'dt
Hence, when no capital flows to or from the infornal  sector, the informal capital growth rate ()
-12-is given by
y1  a'-p-Ab  (14)
Ill.  STEADY STATE
Agents  in the economy  choose at any point in time whether to belong to the formal or the
informal  sector.  We do not allow the simultaneous  participation-  in both sectorst
In the steady state the ratio of.  informal to formal production  or capital is constant
(constantfi) and the economy  grows at a constant rate.  We analyze  first the case when there is
free entry into either sector and afterwards the case when there are some entry costs into the
formal sector.
No Entry  Costs to the Formal Sector
in steady state informal agents want to switch to the formal sector whenever
VY'(k5  Vc (kD
or,
90)  p  (15)
where,
(O 3)  =  e,JF  =  A'r  [C-(1-c)J 
:  ~~~~~P  =-Alog(1-b)  >O
P. is related to the decrease  in utility due to expete  capital expropriation. The function
gOJ can be thoug,ht  of as the difference  in utilities before fines.
- -13- 
. . ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  rBy the same token, in the steady state formals  want to move to the informal sector when
g02  P.
In order for the informal  sector to be present in the economy,  at least g(,=O)  has to be
positive  and greater than P, that is,
P
10[e  - -. r)i>  - (16)
A
Note that the left-hand  side of (16) is increasing  in the tax rate.  This means that, given
the other parameters, the tax rat  has to be high enough if there is to be an informal sector. The
intaition for this is clear:  The only advantage  of being in the informal  sector is not paying taxes.
Figure 1 shows g(6) as a function  offl for the case where (16) obtains. Since P and A
are both positive, the inequality  in (16) implies [e - (1-r)J  >0,  which is the condition  for
* '§  <  O. The negative slope of the function  g(1) means that an increase  in congestion  (through
an increase  in O1)  affects  the informal  sector rate of return more severely  than it affects  the formal
sector one.
Figure 1 helps  us identify-  the stay-state  level of P and how it is affected  by changes  in
the parameters; Figure I is not used to describe transitional  dynanics.  In the steady state, any
individual  is indifferent  between  the two sectors. This occurs when ihe  ratio of formal to
-informal  production  is.  , where g(fi) =P."), The growdt rates of bodL  secors adjust so as to
keep ,B  equal to ,B;  as we explain  below, this requires a net flow of capital from the informal  to
the formal sector.  Not  that values  -of ,B  lower than ,B do not represent  steady states because at
those  points g*0)> P, which means that all individuals  prefer to be in the informal sector, dtus
creating a change in $3.  By the same-  token, for values of ,B  higher than P", g6B)<P, which
"'The superscripF  t*  denotes  steady state.
-14-means that all individuals  prefer to be in the formal sector.
Let -r be the cut-off tax rate at and below  which there is no informal  sector in the
economy,  given the other parameters. That is, r0 is implicitly  given by equation  (16) with
equality:
s  s"[e~(1~T;]  =  A  (17)
Then, the steady state level offl,Br,  is given by
>  ?  -
- @  1 s zCe"-(l-s)]  1  ..  ~~~~~(18)
EP~~~ 
The effect of changes in different  parameters on the value offK can be explained  using
Figure 1.  An increase  in the probability  of being caught (X) or in the size of the penalty (b)
incases  P, thus producing  a decline  in the relative size of the informal  sector.  Higher tax rates
hurt formals-  relative to-  infornals;  and hence when r goes up, g60)  moves upwards and to the
right, thus increasingf#.  In fact, considering,B  -as  a function of tax rates,f> is 0 for 7<T,,  and
it increases  monotonically  with r for r> 70 (see Figure 2)..
When informal  producers can use a higher fraction  -of available  public services  (higher e),
the relative size of the informal sector in the steady state obviously increases. A somewhat  less
obvious  result is that improvements  in exogenous'productivity,'measured  by the parameter A,
result in a relatively bigger infornal sector. The reason for this result is that for high tax rates
and.  given (e  -(1-T)]  >0,  the infornml  sector capures a relatively larger faction  of the
productivity  improvemenLt
-15-Growth
Recall the definition  of i,
y  (l  =  -T)  cF-kF  =Ea
Then for d/dt  = 0, the growti rates of the formal and informal  sectors have to be the same.
From equations.  (9) and (14), we know that if no capitl  flows from one sector to the other,
y-  F=  g(Pf)-Ab  =  -ALlog(1-b)+b]  > 0
This means that if no capital switches sectors, the growti rate of informal  capital is greater than
that of formal  capital, and, thus, ,B  increases. This situation  can not correspond to a steady state-
Therefore, in steady state there will be a constant movement  of capital from the informal  to the
formal sector.  The amount of capital that switches  sectors, le, is obtained  from the condition  of
equal growth rates and is given by
V  l=  og(l  -b)  +b]
AZ  C
Note that the first order approximation  for log(l-b) is given exactly by -b, thus  if b is small  k'
will be very close to 0.
The growth rate of the economy is given by
=1  - - P>0
Substtuting forf'  in the expression  for cit
-16-.. ~~  (l-ijP  r
_F=  e--t)  °  (20)
Assume  that b is small enough so that the growth rate is very close to cf-p.  Given the
negative  effect of ,B on af, the growth rate is decreasing  in,f  whenpl >0.  Hence, as can be
seen in equation  (20), when f  > 0, the growth rate decreases  with r and e and increases  with X
and b.
When the steady-state  size of the informal sector is 0 (Tr￿r9),  the model collapses  to the
one analyzed  by Barro and Sala-i-Martin  (1992), in which a", as function of r, is first increasing,
reaches a maximum at r=/  =aO/(1+aq), and then dedines.  In our model, te  behavior of a" with
respect to r depends on whether r.  is bigger or smaller than r?  Figures 3A and 3B graph aF for
T.<-r  and  CŽ>T, respectively. In both cases, for  >  70,  ciFalways decines with r.
Note that,the rate of-return (a"),'and, thus, the growth rat,  is always decliniing  with the
tax rae  when tere  is an informal seor  in the economy  >0), even in the case when higher
taxes could have positive-  effects on productivity, in the absence of an informal sector (see Figure
3A).  The case when T0 <X  is particularly interestirg because it shows that the opimal tax policy
in the absence of an informal  sector (7) renders subopdmal  return and growth rates when an
informal sector is allowed  for.  The following  explains  why aF-  and, thus, the growth rate always
decreases  with higher tax-rates: When the-tax rate rises, the relative-size  of the informal sector
increases Cjf  goes up).  Suppose that despite such initial increase in  a.  aF was higher man
before.  Considering  the definitions  for the rates of return in equation (4) and the assumption  that
[-  - (1-r)l  >0,  it must be .the  -case  that at increases  proportionally  more than a";  clearly, this is
not a steady-se  equilibrium  (gP)='-aF  is no longer equal to F).  Utilities are equalized  across
:7  - .sectors only when /i  increases  so much that i/  is lower than it was before taxes went up.
Entry Costs to Formality
We model  the access costs to formality  as a one-time  fee paid to government; this fee is
assumed  to be proportional  to the capital to become formal.  As explained  in the introduction,
this access cost reflects regulations  imposed  by govermnent  and its bureaucracy. These
regulations  serve no direct purpose, and, hence, they are a waste of resources from the social
perspective. Let this one-time  cost be given by the fraction  6 of capital, where 0<5 <1.
informals will switch to the formal sector when fornal utility less entry costs exceeds
informal  utility;  that is, when
W (k  S  VF((I'_a)k
or,
g(r)  P  (W)
where,
P'  =  P  +  plog(1-8)
< p
Note that P' can be positive or negative.
Since formAls  face no entry costs to the informal sector, they will switch to the informal
sector when
g(u)  P
Hence, there is a zone of inaction, where nobody  wants to switch sectors.
-18-There are two cases to consider. The first occurs when the entry cost rate (6) is low
enough so that P>P'>  Xb.  In this case, we assume that g(=O)>P'."  This case is presented
in Figure 4A.3  The steady state level of a  is given by tie  intersection  of g'3) and P'.  At  ,
no formal agents want to move to the informal  sector. On the other hand, informal  agents are
indifferent  between the two sectors.  Note that if no capital flows from one sector to the other,
the informal  sector will grow at a faster rate (g(fl) > Xb). Therefore, in order to keep ,B
constant, there will be a constant flow of capital from the informal to the formal sector, as is the
case when there are no access costs.  The ratio of infonnal to formal production  in the steady
stat  (B-) is given by
O  0r




The second case occurs when the entry cost rate (a) is high enough so that P> )b 2P'.
in this case, we assume that gg3=O)>Xb. 1'  This second case is presented in Figure 4B.  aljs
given by the intersection  of g03) and Xb.  In this steady state, neither formal nor infonnal agents
"This assumption is analogous  to the one in equation (16) for the case of no entry costs;  it
makes possible  the presence of an infonnal sector in steady sate.
121  j  drawing Figures 4A and 4B, we assume that P'  is positive. The analysis  is the same if P'
is negative.
"See foomote 11.
-19-want to switch sectors, and both of them grow at the same rate (g(fl) =Xb).  We have not
modeled  the transition to the steady state;  nevertheless,  the following  is a rough characterization
of the trnsition  in a neighborhood  around the steady state, neighborhood  in which there is no
flow of capital from one sector to the ocher:  In Pigure 4B, betweenfl 1 andfl2 no agent switches
sectors; however, between 1, and B, g6B)>  Xb,  so that i>  'yF  implying  that ,B  approaches  p;
and, between Po and  2,  gO  Xb,  so that -y"<z-y,  implying that a3 approaches a  .
In this second case, the ratio of informal  toiformal  production in the steady state (K)  is
given by
0
-*  1  S| a  '[e'-G  1  (21')
fig  aea_l.-s]  =b  (22')
Note that in this case the growth rate of the economy is given by aF-p.
The relative size of the informal sector in this case is greater than that in the case of
sufficiently  low entry cost rates, which in turn is greater than that when there are no entry costs.
Consequenly, th  steady-state  growth rate is highest  when there are no entry costs to fornslity
and lowest  when the entry cost rate is sufficiently  large.
-20-IV.  THE BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENT
Welfare
Let us define social welfare (W  as the sum of individual  utilities. Then,
W = f,(k)  llog(pk)dk  Z+  pBF + (I-i&dB'  (23)
Given that the one time cost to become  formal represents  a pure waste of resources, the
optimal  policy  will have 5=0.  If 6=0,  formal and informal  capital are interchangeable. This
implies Sat the first term in the r.h.s.  of equation (23), which is a function  of the current
distribution  of capital, is independent  of changes in policy parameters. Therefore, maximizing
welfare with respect to the policy  parameters is equivalent  to maximizing  the last two terms in
equation  (23).14
In equilibrium, if the informal  sector exisrs (,'>  0), individual  utility obtained in the
formal sector is equal to that in the informal  sector;  therefore, r=BP.  If the informal  sector
does not exist (f'=0),  obviously  every individual's utility  depends  on e.  In either case,
maximizing  welfare amounts  to maximizing  BF
From the expression  for oplmal individual  utility in the formal sector (equation  (7)), we
see that B'  is a positive function of oF.  Therefore, maximizing  welfare is equivalent to
maximiizing  ci.
As -was  shiown  in the section on aggregate  growth, the growth rate is for all practical
purposes equal to acl-p, and, thus, it is optimized  by maxiniizing  a'.  Therefore, maximizing
welfare is approximately  equivalent  to maximizing  growth.  From now on, when analyzing
"Note that since the optinal choice of parameters does not depend on the current distribution
or level of capital, the optimal solution is time consistent.
-21-opimal welfare and growth, we concentrate  on the maximization  of at.
There are a number of parameters  in the model. We are going to assume  that four of
them are policy  parameters. They are the tax rate (r), the penalty rate (b), the fraction  of public
services  used by informals  (e), and the registration-cost  rate (6).  They seem to be the parameters
that most realistically  would be under government  control.' 5 Note, however,  that assuming  that
these four are the only policy parameters  does not mean that we are restricted  to suboptimal
outcomes; in fact, as we show shortly, using these four parameters  appropriately  allows us to
attain the optimal  outcome.
From the perspective  of social welfare, it is clear that 6 must be set equal to zero.  What
abOUt r, b, and e?
Consider  the relationship  between aF and r for given b and e.  This is represented in
Figures  3A and 3B.  We see that of reaches a maximum  at r9 when To<T,  and at r  when  7TT.
In both cases fi=O.  That is, in order for welfare, growth, and of to be maximized,  it is
necessary  that the infornal sector vanishes.
The maximum  at r  is superior  to the maximum  at re.  As we know, a maximum at T.
occurs  when r0 iS relatively low;  from (17), we learn that r, is low when the economy  is
exogenously  very productive  (high  A), public services  do not contribute  much to production  (low
a), participation  of public  services  by informals  is significant  (high e), and the penalties are not
very severe (low b).  Therefore, by increasing  the penalty rate and decreasing  the fraction  of
public  services  used by informals,  T 0 can be raised until it is at least as big as 7.  In this way, ap
15We keep the assumption  that the probability  of detection  (X)  is exogenously  given.  In reality,
this probability may be controlled by  both govenment  and economic agents, the former by
detennining  the amount  of resources  dedicated  to policing  the informal  sector, and the latter by using
appropriate  "hiding" strategies. We keep X  exogenous  to simplify the analysis.
-22-
t...would reach a maximum at 7.
Hence, when the policy variables can be chariged with no cost,  the optimal policy is
7=7,=7-.  The fact that the optimal outcome is achieved with a proportional tax rate is explained
by the congestion externality.  As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show,  7 can be thought of as
the user fee which effectively internalizes the congestion effect.
We have assumed that there is no cost associated with maintaining the penalty rate at a
certain level and preventing infornals  from using some public services.  More realistically, if a
more severe policy towards infornials involves a higher implementation cost, the optimal policy
will consist of having the actual tax rate 7 equal to 7.,  and having b and E such that T. is less than
but close to r;  to be precise,  optimal b and E occur when the marginal'cost  of adjusting b and f
(cost of policing the informal sector) is equal to its margiala benefit (which comes from having
the tax rate,  7=7 0 ,  closer  tO 7).  This analysis has the implication that optmal  policies may seem
to undertax the economy, for the optimal tax rate in tihis  case falls short of T7. Raising fte  tax
rate to undertake what appears to be profitable public projects hurts  tA  economy, for it invites
the formation of an informal sector.
Finally, although the vanishing of the infonnal sector is necessary to optimize social
welfare,  it is not a sufficient condition.  Notice that if the penalty rate (b) is high enough or the
fraction of public services used by informals (e) is low enough,  no agent will choose to operate in
the informal sector.  Neverdheless, the tax rate may not be at its opfimal value.
Let us summarize and provide some economic interpretaion.  For given parameter
. alues, if the tax rate is below a certain  hreshold level, there is no infomial sector in the
economy.  This is because the costs of being informal (penalties and less usage of public
services) are bigger than its benefits (avoiding  axes).  In fact, as the tax rate increases from  low
-23-levels, productivity  and welfare rise for everyone  because  the distortionary  effect of taxes is more
than compensated  for by the beneficial  effect of public services (which, of course, are tax
financed). Government  would want to raise the tax rate up to the point where productivity  of
public services is maximized. However, this optimal  rate must be below the threshold  rate;
oterwise,  the presence  of the informal sector would add to the distortionary  effect of taxes and
this rate would no longer be optimal. To ensure that the threshold  rate is at least as high as the
optimal tax rate, government  can increase penalties  and prevent informals  from using public
srices,  thus making-  informality  less profitable.
Bureaucracy  d Ioformalit
From  the anaiysis in the previous section  we learn that, for given parameters, an
appropriate  reduction of the tax rate and a sufficient  severity towards the informal sector
eliminate  the incetives for economic  agents to become  informal. If everyone is better off
without  an informal  sector, why may govermnent  not pursue a policy to eliminate  it?
We have treated  government as an impersonal  entity.  In reality government  is managed
by a bureaucracy. This bureaucracy  has the power to collect taxes and penalties and to
administer  the use of public services.
The bureaicracy collects penalties from informal  agents. We have assumed  that these
penalties  are not used to produce public services.  If in fact the bureaucracy  appropriates  at least
some of the penalty revenues, it has the incentive  to promote the  formation and growth of the
informal  sector.  If the informal sector were to disappear, bureaucrats  would lose their special
rents.
The behavior of the bureuascy  depends on the degree of cohesion and coordination
-24-armong  its members,  the extent of its power to dictate  policy,  and its planning  horizon.
Shleifer  and Vishny  (1993)  compare  the case of a bureaucracy  which  behaves  as a single
monopolist  with that composed  of a number  of independent  monopolists.  They show that the
latter type of bureaucracy  leads  to more  corruption  and economic  distortions  than the first one.
They also point  out that a well  coordinated  bureaucracy  is more profitable  to its members.
The behavior  of the bureaucracy  is also determined  by its power  to control  different
policy  instruments  such as tax and penalty  rates, entry costs to formality,  and usage of public
services. When  the bureaucracy  is more accountable  to the public, through  an effective  use of
the political  mechanisms  of democracy,  the powers  to legislate  in its own behalf  diminish. The
bureaucracy  may have  limited  power over some  policy  instruments  and vast powers over others.
For instance,  a bureaucracy  with small legislative  powers  may have  little control  over the
determination  of tax rates but a large control  over penalty  rates and registration  costs.to
formality. The characteristics  and strength  of bureaucracy's  power  change  considerably  from
country  to counny. Related  to the extent  and qualifications  of its power is the time horizon  the
bureaucracy  considers  in taking  policy  decisions. The analysis  presented  so far in the paper
helps  us understand  this decision-rking  process.
Policy decisions  affect  the relative  size of the informal  sector at any point in time (16)  and
its growth  rate (,).  As it was shown  in previous  sections,  a relative  expansion  of the informal
sector  produces  higher congestion  of public  services  and, consequently,  lower  growth.
Therefore,  there tends  to be a trade-off  between  a larger size of the informal  sector (and, thus, a
larger base from which to collect  penalties)  now and in the future. If the bureaucracy's  planning
horizon  is rather short (may be because  it follows  the cycle  of popular  elections),  it will sacrifice
growth for a larger informal  sector  now. Depending  on its power to control  policy instrumnts,
-25-die short-sighted  bureaucracy  will dictate  high tax rates and rather low penalty  rates, will make
more public services  available  to informals,  and will restrict the access to formality. A
bureaucracy  that enjoys a large planning  horizon  will take into account  growth  considerations
more seriously,  understanding  the negative  effect of the congestion  of public  services  on growth.
This bureaucracy  will in fact be interested  in a healthy  formal sector, for it provides  the
resources  to produce public  services, which in turn determine  the productivity  of the informal
sector. Relative  to the short-sighted  bureaucracy,  this will impose  lower  tax rates, higher penalty
rats,  less'  access to public services  by informals,  and fewer restrictions  to formality. The far-
sighted  bureaucracy  behaves  similarly  to those  which  are accountable  to the public, in so far as
the inportance paid to growth is concerned.
The presence  and traits of the informal  sector in different  countries  is very much related
to the characteristics  of their bureaucracy.
V.  PRODUCTION  UNCERTAIWNY  AND CAPITAL MARKETS
In this secfion  we  -extend  the simple  model  by introducing  production  uncertinty and
capital  markets. As it was pointed out in the introduction,  one of the most important
Ce
characteristics  of informality  is the inability  to use capital markets. That is, informal  firms have
restricted  access to credit, and their ability  to participate  of joint ventures  and insurance  mairt
is limited. in order to model this feature, we need to introduce  some kind of uncertinty;  we
have chosen  to introduce  uncerminty  in the production  function.
We keep the same features as in the simple  model  presentd  in previous sections,  not
considering  entry costs.
The net-of-tax  flow of production  for individual  firms in the formal sector is given by
-26-IF  +  )  df(4)
where,
aF=  A(1
Each agent chooses the fraction  w; of her capital, k,, that she wishes to use for production. The
net-of-tax  expected return or flow of production  per uiit of capital is given by  /dt.  The
variable ; follows  a standard Brownian  Motion or Wiener process".  The processes;  sa  zj are
independent  for i  different  fromj.  The parameter o2  is the variance  of reurn  Then, the
variance  of net-of-tax return is given by O 2 dt, where  or'==r(J-7),  and r is the tax rate.  We
assume  a to be constant.
The flow of production  for individual  finns in the informal sector is
I,  +  (25) Yl= £s  CaJJd  oo4c.  'd'
where,
-3i  = A(e8)  - o
The expected  producdon  flows o( and ccl  are the same as in previous sections.
We assume  ta  formals can use the capital market for lending, borrowing, and
diversifying  risks.  Informal  producers cannot  use the capital  markets, for they have no legal
claim to their capitl  stock.
"1That  is, z(t) has stationary,  independent  increments,  continuous  sample  paths, and is nommaily
distributed  with mean zero and variance  t.
-27-The Fonmal  Sector
The formal sector is formed  by a large (infinite)  number  of agents. There is also a large
nunber of intermediaries  in the capital market  These intermediaries  borrow assets from formal
agents and invest them in any of the individual  technologies. Suppose  a given intermediary  with
total assets equal to a invests in N different  technologies,  using a/N units of capital in each of
them. The total return is given by
N 1. R  = a(a Fd + -WE a ldz)
Since the zi processes  are independent,  when N goes to infinity  the stochasic part of the
return converges  to 0.  Hence, using this strategy the intermediary  obtains  R = acids.  It is clear
that this strategy is the best one available  to the intermediary: any other produces the same
expected  return but a higher variance. The large number  of intermediaries  precludes  the
possibility  of any of them takdng  into account  the congestion  externality. We assume that capital
markets  are competitive  and that there are no administrative  costs to intermediaries. Then, given
that the production  technology  is constant returns to scale, intermediaries  will borrow  and lend at
the same interest  rate Wv'.  In sumnmary,  agents in the formal  sector will always choose to operate
through  the capital market, for that allows then to diversify  away  their production  risk.
The ability to use capital  markets allows formal  agents to ignore the production-related
uncertainty  in their optimal  decision  making. Formal agents  now face the same problem  as in the
case with no uncertainty  in production. Therefore,  the solution  for optimal  consumption  and
growth  rate in the formal sector is the same as in section  1.
-28-The Informal Sector
Informal  agents  cannot  use the capital markets  so that  each producer  operates  her own
technology. Consequently,  they  cannot  diversify  away  the risk inherent  in production. The
underlying  assumption  is that informals  will not choose  to form coalitions  since  they cannot
enforce  contracts. As we said above, informal  agents cannot  enforce  contracts  because  they  have
no legal claim to their capital  stock  and do not enjoy the protection  of courts of law.
The budget  constraint  for informal  agent i is
dk,  =  sakt#  +  akAflz  - cdt  - bk1dqi  (26)
Equation  (26) is the short-hand  expression  for the stochastic  integral  of k(t).  Note that, as
opposed  to z,, qi is continuous  in time but not in the state  space.
Note that cl can be interpreted  as the effective  borrowing  rate for infornal producers.
Production  in the informal  sector is carried out by family  firms. In this sense the size of each
informal  flnn is very small (it is actually  negligible  in our model). On the other hand, in the
formal sector, firms work  jointly to diversify  away  their production  uncertainty. In this sense,
formal  firms  are much larger than informal  family  firs.
Informals  maximize  U subject  to (26).  Let V'(kd be the maximized  current value of total
expected  utility U, starting in state  k,.  The Bellman  equation  for V is
p  V'(k)  MAX {log(ci)  + V;(kIc)('Q 1 Xak-c) +  !  V[Wkdc4kik2a
2  (Z7)
+  Xl[V(k,(1  -b)) - fV(k1)])
The first part of the expected  change  in total utility  corresponds  to the continuous
variation  in capital  given by production  and consumption.  The second  part is the standard
infinite  variation  correction  for Ito processes. The last part is the discontinuous  change in utility
-29-caused  by expected  penaldes.
The F.O.C.s for maximizadon  are given  by
1  - (ek 1)  =0o
C,  (28)
V(kl)ki +  V(kdAZ  =  0
We obviously  require that wi  be greater than  0 and smaller  than 1. We choose  not to impose  this
constraint  directly; instead,  we constrain  the parameters  of the model  (as explained  below)  so
that  the condition  obtains. The two equations  in (28) are independent,  and the second  one is
linear in the opimal fraction  of capital  used (w);  therefore,  we can solve  for w; as follows:
Vk(,L'kf)klAa
The optimal  fraction  of capital  used in production  (w) is increasing  in the expected  return and
decreasing  in the variance. The term in parentiesis  in the denominator  is the Arrow-Pratt
measure  of relative  risk aversion.
Substituting  (28) into (27), we get a differential  equation  for V with boundary  condition
lim  VI(k4)ceP'  = 0
The solution  for V is given  by
V'(kd  =  !log(pk,)  + B'  (29)
p
where,
-30-BX  =  E 1  + -iog(l-b)  - 1




We ensure  that the utilization  rate belongs  to r0,1i  by assuming  ac c  a'.
Given  optimal  consumption  and utilization  rates, capital  evolves  according  to
dk  =  (3-p1  )  hi  +-fA  3
Now, aggregate  informal  capital  is
k'  = (1-p4E(k 1Jid)
To get the evolution  of aggregate  informal  capital  (A), we take expected  values  (over
agents)  in (31).  Since  the z, processes  are independent,  E(4lid)  =0.  Hence,  the growth  rate
j  of the informal  sector is given by
r'=  - - lb  - p  (32)
0~2
Steady State
In steady  state infonnal agents  want to switch  to the formal  sector whenever
V'(k,)  s  VF(i)
or,
-31-g(0  <  P  (33)
where,
g(p)  =  V  F
2oa2
P  = -Alog(l-b)
Formals, in tum, want to move to the informal  economy  in the steady state when the
inequality  in (33) is reversed. Hence the rest of the analysis  is the same as in the case of no
uncertainty. The steady state (K)  obtains  when equation  (33) is given with equality.  As before,
the key element  that ensures the existence  and stability  of the steady state is te  negative  slope  of
g0J  (Figure 1 also applies  to this case).  The new element  here is that higher congestion  also
reduces  the rate of capital utilization  in the informal  sector: When a1 decreases  because  of a
higher ,,  uncertainty  becomes  relatively  more important,  thus lowering utility in the informal
sector.
Using Figure 1, we note that when the production  uncertainty  increases  (9  rises), the
curve g(,) shifts to the left, thus decreasing  P'.  More uncertainty  hurts the informal  sector thus
decreasing  its relative size in steady state.
From equation  (33) with equality, we can get an expression  for /3, when  ' > 0,
(1+C),  =  Ap[-(l-r)  +  1-T)2  +  2;P$}]  (34)
Note dtat 70 is implicitly  given by equation  (34) when ,P =0;  and as before, if 7<-r  then  j'=O.
The growth rate is given by the same  expression  as in the case of no uncertainty  (equation
19),  although  the switching  term is slightly  different. The qualitative  implication  for growth  and
-32-welfare  are similar  to those of the simpler  model.
VI.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
This paper studies  the emergence  of informal  sectors and their impact  on growth and
welfare. We argue that the rise of informal  sectors  is a natural  consequence  of the restrictions
imposed  by governments  on optimizing  agents. An informal  satus entails  many  disadvantages;
namnely,  inability  to use the capital  and insurance  markets, lack  of access  to important  public
services,  and propensity  to suffer  penalties  and expropriations. Nevertheless,  despite  those
disadvantages,  some  economic  agents  choose to become  informal  because  the restrictions
government  imposes  on them, by way of taxes  and regulations,  are overwhelming.
Economies  with larger informal  sectors are more inefficient  because  of the disadvantages
inherent  to infornality and because  the loss of tax revenues  hurts the provision  of public  goods
and services. In this paper, we show  that such inefficiency  is reflected  in low rates of return to
all investmenit,  stagnant  growth, and suboptimal  social welfare.
What  explains  government's  socially  inefficient  behavior? It has been argued  that such
behavior  can be explained  by the inertia of bad laws, designed  to meet the social needs of offier
times and places. However,  this explanation  begs the question: what explains  such inertia? We
believe  that bad laws, far from being  removed,  are put forward  because  they  benefit groups in
power. In this paper, we have identified  such groups  with government  bureaucracy,  which
controls  public  services  and has the power to expropriate  capital  from informnal  agents. It thus
follows  that bureaucrats,  having  a vested interest  in a large and growing  informal  sector, create
the incentives  for informality.
In reality, the bureaucracy  is not the only interest  group in society. Many groups  would
-33-like  government  to legislate  regulations  on their behalf. As those special  regulations  are
implemented,  informal  sectors,  trying to avoid them, arise. With widespread  informality,  society
at large suffers.
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